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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding the
Environmental Protection Agency's statutory interpretation of its
authority to impose total maximum daily loads on waters containing
only nonpoint source pollution).
Betty and Guido Pronsolino ("Pronsolinos") filed suit pursuant to
sections 702 and 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
They challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
authority to impose total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") on rivers
only polluted by non-point sources and sought a determination of
whether the Clean Water Act ("CWA") authorized the Garcia River
TMDLs. The district court granted summary judgment to the EPA.
The Pronsolinos appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972. Section 303 of the CWA
required each state to identify the waters within its boundaries for
which the required effluent limitations are not stringent enough to
establish applicable water quality standards. Section 303(d)(1)(C)
required states to-establish TMDLs on the waters it identified within its
boundaries. In 1992, the EPA set TMDLs on the Garcia River in
California pursuant to this provision of the CWA.
In 1998, the Pronsolinos and other landowner along the Garcia
River applied for harvesting permits. The EPA granted the permits,
but required the landowners to comply with certain restrictions,
including the TMDLs previously set by the EPA. The Pronsolinos
subsequently filed suit.
The EPA argued the court should defer to their interpretation of
the CWA regulations based on Chevron, which held that an agency's
statutory interpretation is entitled to such deference if "Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and... the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of law." The Pronsolinos did not contest
the EPA's rulemaking authority, but instead argued that the EPA failed
to exercise it here. The Pronsolinos argued the EPA should receive no
deference because it inconsistently interpreted section 303(d). The
court interjected a middle standard of deference set out in Skidmore,
where deference was determined according to the agency's
persuasiveness.
With regard to the EPA's rulemaking and interpretation of the
laws, the court determined that the Chevron standard applied because
of the delegated authority of the EPA to interpret the CWA. Even still,
the court decided it should apply, at a minimum, deference under
Skidmore. However, the court found both standards resulted in the
same decision. It held the EPA's regulations of TMDLs applied
regardless of how the water body received its pollution. Disagreeing
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that the EPA had inconsistently interpreted the statute at issue, the
court found that the EPA interpreted the statute today exactly as it did
initially.
The Pronsolinos contended the EPA upset the balance of the
federal and state control created by the CWA by establishing TMDLs
for waters impaired only by nonpoint source pollution. The court
disagreed and determined the Garcia River TMDLs served as an
informational tool for the creation of the state's implementation plan,
which Congress independently and explicitly requires. Thus, the court
found no merit in the federalism argument.
Ultimately, the court upheld EPA's reasonable interpretation of
the CWA, finding that the EPA did not exceed its statutory authority in
identifying the Garcia River pursuant to section 303(d) (1) (A) and
establishing the Garcia River TMDLs, even though the river was
polluted only by non-point sources of pollution.
Staci A. McComb
Ka Makani 'O Kohala Ohana Inc. v. Dep't of Water Supply, 295 F.3d
955 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the minimal economic involvement of a
federal agency does not satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act's
"major Federal action" requirement mandating an environmental
impact statement).
Ka Makani '0 Kohala Ohana ("Ka Makani"), a citizen's coalition,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
requesting injunctive relief against the Hawaii Department of Water
Supply ("DWS") and other federal and county agencies and officials
pending the completion of a federal environmental impact statement
("EIS").
The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, DWS. Ka Makani appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's
decision granting summary judgment to DWS.
DWS began planning the Kohala water project in 1987. The water
project would transfer as much as 20 million gallons of groundwater
per day from the northern part of Kohala to the southern part of
Kohala. The project involved two governmental agencies, the United
States Geological Survey ("USGS") and the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The USGS provided
partial funding for the project and participated in a series of
preliminary studies, which assessed the groundwater availability. In
1988, the DWS and the USGS entered into four Joint Funding
Agreements, which divided the costs of the studies. HUD involved
itself after Congress passed an appropriations bill allotting $500,000 to
the County of Hawaii for an EIS. HUD provided application materials
and advice, including a recommendation restricting the scope of the
activities. Narrowing the scope of the project exempted it from the

